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Abstract. A conceptual analysis of trust in terms of trustworthiness is set out, 
where trustworthiness is the property of an agent that she does what she claims she 
will do, and trust is an attitude taken by an agent to another, that the former 
believes that the latter is trustworthy. This analysis is then used to explore issues in 
the deployment of trustworthy digital systems online. The ideas of a series of 
philosophers from the Enlightenment – Hobbes, Burke, Rousseau, Hume, Smith 
and Kant – are examined in the light of this exploration to suggest how we might 
proceed in the Digital Enlightenment to ensure that systems are both trustworthy 
and trusted. 
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Introduction 
Trust has been an enormous topic in the study of the World Wide Web, as evinced by 
the number of scholarly papers, the number of workshops associated with Web and 
Semantic Web conferences, and the prominence of trust in the layered model of the 
Semantic Web. Beyond that trust is a complex social phenomenon with a range of 
interpretations and understandings which have generally emerged by deriving theories 
of trust from paradigm cases, or particular social theories. As trust is deeply context-
dependent, such paradigms have many idiosyncratic features, and the social setting 
often gets in the way of the important commonalities. The result is that much is often 
left out. 
For example, on Niklas Luhmann’s influential account trust is “an effective form 
of complexity reduction” [20], which is of course true, but is this a defining condition? 
There are many other reasons to trust. Many theories are built upon an analysis of face-
to-face trusting relations between individual humans, which may or may not 
extrapolate to the World Wide Web [26]. Others take a ‘revealed preference’ attitude to 
trust (i.e. that taking part in an interaction entails trust in one’s partners), which makes 
empirical investigation easier but creates a reductive equivalence between trust and the 
assumption of risk. We have to ask ourselves if this is a helpful way of looking at trust; 
for instance, if I give someone a 5* rating on eBay, I have thereby behaviourally 
demonstrated my trust in him or her, but I have not thereby taken a risk (although I 
presumably did take a risk earlier during our eBay transaction). 
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169The lesson for Web Science is to avoid the trap of extrapolating sui generis 
theories of Web trust from particular areas of Web experience (such as social 
networking, or cybercrime). Much of human life is on the Web, and as new 
applications emerge and the Anglo-American-European bias of the Web declines, 
theories of Web trust will need sensitivity to many unpredictable and culturally-relative 
factors. The Web is not a technological realm in isolation; it is increasingly integrated 
into our work and leisure lives. Understanding trust on the Web involves understanding 
trust in human life. 
A further error that is often made is to assume trust is a benefit, which should be 
unconditionally promoted: “how do we increase trust?” For instance, Fukuyama’s 
influential account argues that “in all successful economic societies [economic] 
communities are united by trust” ([6], p.9), and that therefore we should aim for a high 
trust society. This is only partly true. Trust makes no sense, as I shall argue, without the 
prior concept of trustworthiness. The problem of trust, then, is emphatically not to 
increase trust unconditionally, but rather to link trust and trustworthiness effectively. 
Fukuyama should have spelt out a twofold aim: (i)  become a high trustworthiness 
society, in which (ii) trust is placed effectively. Similarly, Luhmann’s claim that trust 
reduces complexity can only be true when trust is well-placed (badly-placed trust will 
make things more difficult). This is as true online as anywhere else; the key 
requirement is to enable causal links between trust and trustworthiness. 
In this paper I shall set out a conceptual analysis of trust (and trustworthiness) to 
underpin a range of trust relations, across not just human agents but non-human agents 
as well [24]. It is meant to apply to both rational and irrational decisions to trust. Its 
purpose is to highlight the key parameters that need to be accounted for when 
considering a trust relation, and which hopefully will feed into the design and 
development of Web technologies. 
The concept of the Digital Enlightenment is a fascinating one, with the Web as a 
means of recreating the public space that allowed Enlightenment thought to flourish [6], 
[22]. Indeed, the Web fills the role allotted in the previous era to Diderot’s 
Encyclopédie, “to collect all the knowledge scattered over the face of the earth, to 
present its general outlines and structure to the men with whom we live, and to transmit 
this to those who will come after us” ([5], p.17). Trust and trustworthiness were 
problematic for those Enlightenment philosophes who desired to place them on a 
rational foundation. Someone who places trust in someone else usually (not always) 
accepts vulnerability; it is hard, with a rationalist individualist moral psychology, to 
explain why anyone under those circumstances would take the trouble to be 
trustworthy. This raises a number of difficult philosophical issues of course [14], but is 
problematic for the Web as a socio-technical construct in particular, as any 
implementable models of interaction between people and machines must assume 
rationality as a principle ([31], pp.26-27). I shall discuss modern day online trust in the 
context of theories of trust and trustworthiness from the Enlightenment period, taking 
ideas from Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Edmund Burke (1729-97), Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-78), David Hume (1711-76), Adam Smith (1723-90) and Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804) and recasting them for the Digital Enlightenment. 
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In this section I will set out an analysis of trust in more detail. This will be in four parts, 
an analysis of trustworthiness, upon which will be built an analysis of trust. A 
discussion of failures of trust and trustworthiness follows, and finally I shall discuss 
issues surrounding the connection of the two. The analyses of trust and trustworthiness 
are developed in more detail in a working paper [24]. 
1.1. Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness is prior to trust, which is an attitude toward the trustworthiness of 
others. Indeed, as Hardin has argued [9], [10], many supposed commentators on trust 
are actually discussing trustworthiness. What, then, is this prior concept? 
A trustworthy person is someone who does what she says she will do, all things 
being equal. This characterisation conceals quite a lot of structure. First of all, 
trustworthiness is a property of an agent. A claim must be made about her future 
actions. After all, it is absurd to accuse Barack Obama of being an untrustworthy brain 
surgeon, because he has never claimed to have brain surgery skills. The claim will also 
have the effect of narrowing the scope of trustworthiness; put another way, 
trustworthiness is context-dependent. The ‘all things being equal’ clause means that a 
trustworthy person need not succeed in carrying out the claimed behaviour, but if she 
does not, there must be an explanation for her failure which will absolve her of 
responsibility. 
We can therefore define trustworthiness as a four-place relation, as follows: 
 
Y is trustworthy =df  Tw<Y,Z,R,C>      (1) 
where Y and Z are agents, R is a representation of the claim and C is a (task) 
context in which it applies 
 
In (1), Y is the agent who, if (1) is true, is trustworthy. R is the content of the claim 
made about her
2 intentions, capacities and motivations in future behaviour; when (1) is 
true, Y’s behaviour will be constrained by R. R may be explicitly written down, or may 
be implicit and understood; it may be open-ended and deliberately left unspecific to 
degrade gracefully. C is the set of contexts in which R is intended to apply (for instance, 
Y may claim to be a trustworthy car mechanic, but only within office hours, and only 
on certain makes of car). 
This leaves Z, who is the agent responsible for generating and disseminating the 
claim R. In many, perhaps most, circumstances, Y = Z. However, this need not be the 
case. A trustworthy customer service employee respects a role description generated by 
her company. A trustworthy piece of software performs according to a specification 
written by a designer. It is essential that Z is authorised to make the claim about Y. 
Without authority, Z’s claim has no bearing on Y’s trustworthiness. 
                                                           
2 I shall use these and other variables consistently throughout this paper to refer to 
occupiers of the various roles delineated. Additionally, to help defuse ambiguities I 
shall use masculine pronouns for the trustor (who will be christened X) and feminine 
pronouns for the trustee Y. To underline an obvious point to those who do not care to 
distinguish between grammatical and sexual gender, I do not thereby intend to suggest 
that only men trust and that only women are trustworthy. 
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Given that trustworthiness is a property of an agent, this leads us to the question of how 
that relates to trust. This is straightforward: trust is an attitude toward the 
trustworthiness of another. In other words, X trusts Y iff he believes that she is 
trustworthy.
3 
This is still a complex idea, however. Not only does trustworthiness bring with it 
context-dependency, but trust forces us to confront a subjective element. Trust is not as 
simple as X believing (1). Broadly speaking, there are six parameters of consequence in 
the trust relation, as follows: 
 
X trusts Y =df  Tr<X,Y,Z,I(R,c),Deg,Warr>     (2) 
with Y, Z and R as before, and X an agent 
 
In (2), the first three parameters are the relevant agents. X is the trustor, and Y the 
trustee. Z, as before, is the agent who makes the claim R about Y’s intentions, 
capacities and motivations. And again, as before, it could be that Z = Y (it could also 
be that X = Y and X = Z as well, although we don’t need the details of these identities 
here [24]). 
Z makes a claim that Y’s behaviour, all things being equal, will conform to R in 
contexts C. X’s trust, if well-placed, should accept that claim. However, it need not, 
because X is only boundedly rational and communications between Z and X could fail. 
Furthermore, as noted above, R might be implicit or unspecific. Hence X has to 
interpret R for the contexts in which he is interested. I have written this as a function 
I(R,c), to be read as an interpretation of the force of R in the set of contexts that interest 
X, which I term c. 
This brings trust’s subjective aspect to the fore – for X’s trust, it is X’s 
interpretation that counts, whether or not it is correct. That highlights further 
restrictions on trust. As it is an attitude held by X about Y, it is X who supplies the 
underlying assumptions of the judgment. This has two specific consequences. First, for 
X to trust Y, it need not be the case that Z has authority to make claim R about Y. It is 
necessary and sufficient that X believes that Z has that authority. Second, I(R,c) only 
has any force with respect to Y if c  C, otherwise it will fall out of the scope of R. Yet 
for X’s trust, it is necessary and sufficient only that X believes that c  C. If either of 
these beliefs is false – i.e. if Z does not have the authority to make claim R about Y, or 
if c  C – X’s trust will be misplaced as based on a misunderstanding. In any case, Y’s 
interpretation of R in c may well be very different from X’s. 
In short, in definition (2) above, Z has to be such that X believes that he can 
authoritatively make claim R about Y, and I(R,c) is X’s subjective interpretation of R 
within a set of contexts c, such that X believes that c  C. 
                                                           
3 I shall use ‘belief’ as a basic noun covering the propositional attitude in question, 
but this is a linguistic shorthand. I do not wish to judge the philosophical issues of 
whether only humans can trust, or whether language is required for belief. The 
definition of trust given below is neutral between humans and non-humans. Can 
animals trust? Can organisations trust? Can artificial agents trust? Can babies trust? 
These questions boil down to the issue of whether they can hold an attitude toward 
another – not to the question of whether they are able to have beliefs. 
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subjectivity. Most obviously, X can negotiate with Y to determine more precisely the 
content of Y’s claim R, and how it will affect X in the contexts c with which he is 
concerned. 
This leaves two more parameters. Deg is a measure of X’s confidence in his 
attitude toward Y’s trustworthiness. The metric for Deg depends on the system under 
discussion. For psychological realism, it may be that Deg would be a fairly coarse-
grained Likert-type psychometric scale of five or seven points. But it would be 
legitimate to produce more complex models that modelled Deg on, say, the real line 
between 0 and 1. 
Whatever metric chosen must facilitate two judgments that X will need to make. 
First of all, X may have to choose whether he trusts Y1 more than Y2 when he decides 
where to place his trust. Secondly, the level of risk that X takes on with respect to an 
interaction with Y will depend on his degree of trust; if he trusts her a lot, he will, all 
things being equal, be prepared to risk a lot, and if he trusts her only a little, his appetite 
for risk will be diminished.  
Warr is the warrant for X’s trust in Y. This could take any form – it doesn’t have to 
be rational, and could even be that X has been dosed with oxytocin which increases the 
propensity to trust [17]. But usually there is a sensible rationale behind a trust 
judgment, which is important for assessing it, and also for assessing how robust it is 
likely to be. Typical relatively reliable trust warrants include the reputation of Y, the 
past history of X’s encounters with Y, the availability of sanctions for X, the possibility 
of a binding reciprocal agreement between X and Y, the credible commitments made 
by Y and the credentials that Y brings to the transaction. 
As Wierzbicki argues ([31], pp.26-27), trust that does not have a rational 
component will be hard to model. That does not mean that trust cannot be irrational, 
but it makes it harder to embed psychologically-realistic trusting mechanisms into 
software, or to design socio-technical systems (or social machines) which incorporate 
potentially irrational human trust judgments without restriction. 
1.3. Failures of Trust and Trustworthiness 
The problem of trust highlights the possibility of failure. The negations of (1) and (2) 
deserve some attention. 
First of all, we should distinguish between a lack of trustworthiness (for some R 
and C) and untrustworthiness. There is an important gap between someone who makes 
no claims to trustworthiness and someone who makes a false claim. Barack Obama is 
not a trustworthy brain surgeon, but as we have already discussed this does not redound 
to his discredit; neither he nor any authoritative Z who speaks for him has made a claim 
to that effect. I am within my rights to point out that Obama is not a trustworthy brain 
surgeon, but I cannot use this as a criticism. 
The term ‘untrustworthiness’ is reserved for those circumstances where Y has 
made a claim R which does not describe her intentions, capacities and motivations 
correctly. Even then, the level of discredit accruing to Y will vary. If she has deceived 
X deliberately, then she has behaved immorally and is deserving of censure if not 
proceedings for fraud. But her deception may be unintentional. For instance, she may 
have overestimated her capacity to perform R. She may have offered to help with her 
daughter’s homework, but found herself incapable of remembering the mathematics of 
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deception. However, in each case it is fair to describe Y as untrustworthy. 
Failure to trust also comes in a variety of packages. What might make X fail to 
hold the appropriate attitude to Y as described by (2)? In the first place, he may never 
have heard of Y, or may be unaware of Y’s intentions, capacities and motivations, and 
hence simply not have formed the appropriate attitude. Secondly, he may be aware that 
Y has made no relevant claim R (so he may not trust Obama to perform brain surgery, 
but that’s OK as no-one has suggested he does). 
The third option is active distrust, where X’s attitude toward Y is fully informed 
(in X’s opinion), and consists, in effect, in the belief that she is untrustworthy. In other 
words, X believes that Y’s intentions, capacities and motivations are not as represented 
by R, which has been presented by an authoritative Z. This, of course, is a very strong 
claim that is worth more analysis than space here allows. 
1.4. The Problem of Trust 
The problem of trust, as argued above, is not to increase trust, but rather to ensure that 
X trusts Y when and only when Y is trustworthy. This is difficult as the incentives are 
not optimally aligned. If X risks assets in an interaction with Y, then he benefits from 
her trustworthiness, but unfortunately he only controls his trust. Similarly, Y benefits 
from X’s trust, but only controls her trustworthiness. The result is a dilemma where the 
benefits of cooperation could be high, but losses to a trusting (trustworthy) party would 
accrue if their partner is untrustworthy (distrusting). 
From this two things follow. First, trust cannot be an entirely rational attitude; it is 
not the sort of thing to survive rigorous game-theoretic analysis [14]. Second, X should 
use the analysis of (2) to determine where trust judgments can break down. Many 
failures of trust are down to differences in interpreting what Y is committed to. 
A typical strategy for a trustworthy Y is to send signals of trustworthiness to X, 
which ideally will accurately represent her trustworthiness and which will be included 
in X’s warrant to trust Y [25]. These signals can be conscious or unconscious, and 
more or less strongly connected with the task that Y is offering to carry out, preferably 
as an unavoidable by-product. The flip side of any such signalling system, however, is 
that if it is made explicit, then it can potentially be counterfeited by an untrustworthy 
person. Types of signal already mentioned include Y’s reputation, history and credible 
commitments. 
A second strategy involves structuring the encounter with some kind of institution 
which can reduce the likelihood of a deception being in Y’s interest. Such an institution 
might supply credentials for Y, or might make plausible and effective sanctions 
available for X to apply if Y defects. Or X and Y might set up their own ‘mini-
institution’ by entering into a reciprocal agreement. 
If we generate some numbers, we can present the dilemmas for X and Y in a two-
person one-shot game. Suppose there is a situation where, if X trusts Y with an 
investment of €3, each can walk away with €10 profit. X has the choice of trusting or 
distrusting Y; Y has the choice of being trustworthy or untrustworthy. We can assume 
that trustworthiness has costs of its own (say, €1), to cover the arrangements that Y 
would have to make to ensure that she can carry out her claims. 
The situation then looks like this: 
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X\Y Trustworthy  Untrustworthy 
Trust  10,9 -3,  3 
Distrust  0,-1 0,0 
The upper left quadrant gives the maximum benefits of cooperation. If X trusts 
untrustworthy Y, then he is defrauded out of €3. If X fails to trust untrustworthy Y, 
nothing is gained or lost, while if X fails to trust trustworthy Y, we have opportunity 
costs for both parties, plus the expenses of trustworthiness for Y. 
If X or Y is risk-averse, there is little hope of reaching the maximal payoff. X may 
reason that if he trusts Y, then, although he might gain €10, he might also lose €3. If he 
distrusts, then he can be no worse off than he is. Similarly, risk-averse Y might reason 
that if she is trustworthy, she might end up worse off than before, but if she is 
untrustworthy, she is no worse off and may even gain €3 from a credulous X. 
2. Trust in the Digital World 
The previous section was intended to be entirely general. As Bus has written, “the 
concepts of security, trust and as a consequence privacy as developed in democratic 
societies, are fundamental drivers for self-organisation in our society” [3]. Bus points 
out that the above theory can point X to particular strategies to investigate whether Y’s 
untrustworthiness was due to a particular type of claim R, or a misleading agent Z. 
Such an investigation can lead to a reconfiguring of the relation between X, Y and Z 
(and alternatives for Z), and a renegotiation of the content of R and C. 
The particular issue in the digital world is that the number of actors is larger, while 
the bandwidth along which they can send signals is lower, resulting in less information. 
The warrants for trust (particularly rational trust) are therefore being stretched, and a 
situation has been created where recognised signals for trust can be subverted. Phishing 
attacks, for instance, are dangerous not only for ordinary Web users, but even for those 
with high levels of computer literacy [4]. Complexity and uncertainty introduce greater 
vulnerabilities. 
Bus adapts (1) to define the trustworthiness of technology as “the behaviour of the 
technology within a given context in conformity with its representation as published by 
the accredited agent” [3]. Y, on this reading, is the trustworthy system or technology. 
The accredited agent (Z, in our terminology of variables) consists of at least the 
software producer, dealer or marketing team, while R is a specification, advert or other 
representation of the technology’s behaviour which is liable to influence X’s decision 
to buy it or to rely upon it. These definitions will be expanded below. 
First note that R cannot be restricted simply to the technical specification but must 
draw upon implicit factors which affect trustworthiness. It includes expectations of 
functionality of any software or technology, and also legal agreements and waivers, 
particularly privacy policies and anything else the user has consented to either 
implicitly or explicitly. Other factors include: robustness across environments; 
robustness against hostile attack; usability and the ability to cope with users’ errors, 
compliance with law and regulation, such as data protection; and compliance with 
contractual agreements with users. 
Note also an important shift between (1) and (2). The content of (1) is determined 
in part by Z’s specification R of Y’s behaviour and functionality, and the restriction of 
the scope of R to a set of contexts C (which could be done via the terms and conditions 
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X’s interpretation of R and its effects in a subset c of C (the subset of contexts which 
interest X). 
It is clear that there is suddenly great scope for miscommunication and 
misunderstanding, particularly in the digital world where many claims are shrouded in 
technical obscurity, where there is great ignorance about the implications of the use of 
information, where there may be several legal jurisdictions covering a single 
transaction, and where there are relatively few widely-accepted norms of behaviour. In 
particular, it may well be that X’s interpretation of R does not coincide with Y’s, and 
that X’s area of interest c is not a proper subset of C. 
These issues can arise in particular when R is a very technical specification, but 
X’s interpretation I is couched in the social terms which X understands. Bus’s example 
of an ID card is a good one: the card may meet a complex technical specification R 
developed by a government Z, but X prefers to interpret the card in terms of his social 
and political interpretation of such issues as privacy, crime and security, and the 
disagreeable extension of powers of government that he has observed over the years. Z 
may be concerned with minimising legal liabilities, while X may be interested more in 
how he will be empowered and constrained by the new technology. 
In other words, X and Z may simply be speaking different languages. A piece of 
technology is not seen as a secure piece of kit, but rather as an instrument of 
empowerment and/or security and/or repression, depending on the point of view of the 
trustor. Technical capabilities are not judged in the abstract. As Charles Raab puts it, “it 
is no comfort to a privacy-aware individual to be told that inaccurate, outdated, 
excessive and irrelevant data about her are encrypted and stored behind hacker-proof 
firewalls until put to use by (say) a credit-granting organization in making decisions 
about her” ([27], p.285). 
The particular danger is that Z will focus, in the construction of R, on the technical 
specification in isolation. This, in the digital world, is an enormous mistake. X’s 
interpretation of R will go way beyond the technical specification (and indeed from X’s 
point of view the specification may be of very minor importance). X will focus on the 
policies to which he has consented (and, as we know that very few people scrutinise 
terms and conditions and privacy policies in detail, X’s beliefs about those will be 
general, abstract and impressionistic), the marketing which has attracted him, and the 
affordances of the technology that he has observed in the world around him. 
3. Enlightenment Thoughts on Trustworthiness and Trust 
The complexity and uncertainty described by Bus and others exacerbate the difficulties 
caused by the subjective shift between (1) and (2), from Z’s understanding of Y’s 
intentions, capacities and motivations to X’s. Yet as we work toward bringing about a 
Digital Enlightenment, it is worth noting that trust was a major concern of the original 
Enlightenment. The philosophes of that era wrestled with the question of how we 
ensure, or promote, trustworthiness in a world where untrustworthiness often pays. As 
David Hume put it, can we find “a remedy, in the judgement and understanding, for 
what is irregular and incommodious in the affections” ([15], p.489)? In particular, some 
of the great political thinkers of the 17
th and 18
th centuries can still give us important 
pointers as to how to deal with the conundrums discussed in section 2. Their work can 
also alert us to some of the pitfalls. 
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The most obvious point about promoting trust was made by Thomas Hobbes, who 
argued in Leviathan (1651) that an unregulated free-for-all would be undermined by the 
tendency of people driven by glory (or kudos), competition and the needs of the self to 
act against the common good. In conditions of resource-scarcity, the sum of our actions 
will defeat our individual ends. There is therefore a need for a sovereign, Leviathan (a 
state or government), to regulate and keep the peace [13]. 
Regulation will certainly be an important part of the story of how we link trust and 
trustworthiness. By providing constraints and sanctions on Y, Y’s intentions, capacities 
and motivations are altered to make divergence from R less likely, and therefore X’s 
degree of confidence in her trustworthiness should increase. Yet Hobbes’ Leviathan has 
duties of its own, especially the maintenance of peace and security and the prevention 
of discord. Hobbes pioneered the idea of contractual bases for political settlements. 
Hence Hobbesian regulation must be relatively lightweight, to allow citizens 
maximum liberty consistent with the prevention of discord, because that is the 
contractual basis of the relationship between citizens and Leviathan. This is especially 
important in the online world, given the extraordinary innovation that the Web has 
fostered in the last couple of decades. 
Much commentary on Hobbes has focused on Leviathan’s monopoly of power and 
legitimate violence; this monopoly is less relevant online, where the W3C’s voluntary 
standards compete with various national and supranational entities asserting their 
power, and where code can regulate action just as easily as governments and standards 
setters [19]. But the contract between citizen and Leviathan does remind us of the many 
contractual relationships between Web service providers and users. At the moment, 
providers make the pace in such contracts. Many commentators have pointed out the 
unsatisfactory nature of our clicking consent boxes, and ‘accepting’ privacy policies by 
entering a website. This is absurd, and does not help establish warranted relations of 
trust between users and providers. 
Regulation needs to be tailored more closely to the needs of Web users, in order to 
allow users to make informed decisions about consent etc. It is a common assumption 
that users are ignorant of technical matters (which may be true), and that therefore their 
decisions are uninformed. Nevertheless it is also true that decisions are framed in terms 
which make no sense to users. 
For example, consider a privacy policy on a social networking site. This is an 
extremely important document for a user, because it may well affect his or her self-
determination, if information or images from such a site become available to potential 
employers, family members or intimate friends indefinitely into the future. This is a 
complex issue, and the document itself will also be complex. Yet the act of acceptance 
is a crude binary decision. The decision is binding even if the policy changes in the 
future (which is doubly absurd). Furthermore, in the US at least, a company’s privacy 
policy is regulated by the Federal Trade Commission which looks for deceptive or 
unfair practices – in other words, it asks whether the company did what it said it would 
do (which is an important part of the definition of trustworthiness). However, the FTC 
does  not ask whether this specification accords to some independent definition of 
privacy. In other words, the FTC does not care whether a privacy policy actually 
protects users’ privacy, as long as the company adheres to it. 
In such cases, the company may be trustworthy by its own definitions, but may fail 
to instil trust in its users (i.e. Y conforms to R, but fails to conform to I(R,c)). Hobbes 
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sensitive to the needs of users as well as service providers. Consent, in particular, can 
and should be handled more sensitively.
4 
3.2. Burke and the Wisdom of Crowds 
Regulation can never be the whole story with respect to trust. As the Enlightenment 
historian Edward Gibbon wrote, “a thousand quarrels must arise under a law, and 
among men, whose sole umpire was the sword.” If regulation was the only constraint 
then innovative firms would circumvent it, or be untrustworthy when they were sure 
they would not be found out. Fortunately, however, the Enlightenment bequeathed 
more social tools and relationships which we can adapt as we build the Digital 
Enlightenment. 
A number of Enlightenment thinkers investigated ways in which rational 
individuals sustain strong connections with their embedding societies, and these 
political discussions remain the basis of political philosophy today ([22], pp.66-114). 
We can make an immediate reference to the great conservative philosopher Edmund 
Burke, who pitched himself as an opponent of Enlightenment, but, I as have argued 
elsewhere ([22], pp.105-107), was a definite product of Enlightenment thought. Like 
Rousseau, he reacted against many of his contemporaries, yet produced a defiantly and 
clearly modern philosophy. 
Burke’s insight was that reason and design are not enough. Central committees and 
planners cannot create usable institutions. The most powerful institutions emerge from 
behaviour, and from practice that is meaningful to people. No small number of thinkers 
however well-intentioned and incorruptible can create a public space that has the same 
connections with citizens. Yet “Your literary men, and your politicians, and … the 
whole clan of the enlightened among us, … have no respect for the wisdom of others; 
but they pay it off by a very full measure of confidence in their own” ([2], p.184). 
Burke instead approved of what is now called the wisdom of crowds [30], and looked 
to tradition and even prejudice as ways of ensuring that society cohered – the effective 
aggregation of very many individual subjective points of view. The individual is in no 
position to judge wider social requirements. “We are afraid to put men to live and trade 
each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man 
is small, and that the individuals would be better to avail themselves of the general 
bank and capital of nations, and of ages” ([2] p.183). 
It so happens, of course, that the Web has always included impressive methods to 
aggregate opinion, from PageRank to Wikipedia to recommender systems. Social 
networking has been an entirely unpredicted success, which has brought the Web in a 
meaningful way to very many more people (it has relevance for their leisure and private 
lives, as well as being a valuable work tool). The lesson from Burke is the power of the 
Web 2.0 paradigm. 
He also pointed out the need for measures to be taken to preserve important public 
goods (for example, ensuring data protection), and to prevent what has been called the 
noosphere undermining people’s individuality. It is essential to realise that system 
designers cannot decide for themselves how a system will be used; if it is used widely 
                                                           
4   See the projects EnCoRe (http://www.encore-project.info/) and VOME 
(http://www.vome.org.uk/) which are beginning the task of providing more sensitive 
mechanisms for managing consent. 
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between users, administrators and designers. 
3.3. Rousseau and the General Will 
Such ideas get us closer to trust and trustworthiness, because the interactions that Web 
2.0 supports are voluntary, and basically focused around common pursuits that help 
bind communities. Of course these can be undermined by individual impersonators 
who introduce bad faith, such as the American PhD student at a Scottish university 
(ironically, Adam Smith’s and David Hume’s old university) who posed as a lesbian 
Syrian blogger. They can also be undermined by more structural intercessions; for 
example, a social network might exploit the data it holds about its users to support 
targeted and intrusive marketing. This could undermine trust in the platform, which in 
turn might lead to a decline in the number of interactions occurring on it, although it 
need not necessarily reduce offline trust within communities of users. 
In this context, Burke’s ideas can be supplemented with additional thoughts from 
his philosophical opponent Rousseau (Burke opposed the French revolution, while 
Rousseau was Robespierre’s chief source of inspiration). But they agreed on the 
importance of community. Rousseau theorised the general will, a democratic construct 
that viewed the interests of the people as a whole as something that transcended the 
interests of individuals or of particular factions. Rousseau makes it clear that “there is 
often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter 
considers only the common interest, the former considers private interest, and is no 
more than a sum of particular wills” ([28], p.203). Genuine aggregation of opinion is 
important. A legitimate consensus is formed when all individuals are treated equally, in 
an absence of factions ([28], p.225). 
However, it is equally important that individuality is retained within, and against, 
consensus where appropriate [18]. Rousseau (unlike Burke) was not very sensitive to 
the risks of totalitarianism ([21], pp.109-125). Modern commentators such as Jaron 
Lanier emphasise the importance of retaining individuality within frameworks that 
allow liberty of expression. Rousseau’s ambivalence about oppression should not, of 
course, be replicated today. 
What does this mean for trustworthiness in the online world? In particular, it 
suggests that we should conceive of agency holistically. Individuals’ preferences are of 
course important, but the public space of the Web is an important good that needs to be 
protected [7], [8], an argument that is already familiar in the context of the Web [32]. 
But whose agency matters? 
Trust is an individual’s judgment. Someone creating a trustworthy system certainly 
needs to think in abstract terms about its users, but from our 21
st century viewpoint, it is 
to be hoped that individuals can be disaggregated to express themselves as individuals 
[18]. However, there is a point to aggregation. When we look at (1) above and consider 
the arguments at the end of section 3.2, it is clear that Y and Z cannot be treated as 
simple individuals to be judged within a framework that they themselves set; online 
trust, as noted, goes well beyond checking that a system meets a target specification. 
Indeed, the system itself – represented by the variable Y in (1) – can be seen at 
several levels. The technology does not come unaccompanied, but is integrated into a 
social system with which the trustor is confronted. Particular individuals in that system, 
including the technological agent Y, are not the focus of judgments by trustors. The 
system itself is the important agent here, not the smaller technological component. We 
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important agent when trustworthiness is being designed and planned for, because that is 
the agent that X will be making his trust judgments about. 
Similar thoughts apply to Z. This is not the system designer or producer in 
isolation; several individuals will have been involved, in any major online 
development, in creating a system using regulations and financial incentives as well as 
the actual code. Claims of trustworthiness of the form (1) should ensure that Y and Z 
are conceived as holistically as possible, because that is how X will be making his trust 
judgments. If the interests of Z and X are to be aligned (so that trustworthiness and 
trust can flourish simultaneously), they have to agree on the object of X’s trust. 
Furthermore, we must ensure that any system design does not privilege anyone’s 
interests, and does not assume that the system is the only thing at issue. Annette Baier 
complains that “the more we ignore dependency relations between those grossly 
unequal in power and ignore what cannot be spelled out in explicit acknowledgement, 
the more readily will we assume that everything that needs to be understood about trust 
and trustworthiness can be grasped by looking at the morality of contract” ([1], p.106). 
Baier’s point is highlighted when we compare Hardin’s definition of encapsulated trust 
([10], pp.16-20) with Hayek’s definition of coercion ([11], p.133), and discover that 
they are extremely similar. Trust can become coercive if we are not careful (for 
example, a social network might allow users to express themselves, while insisting they 
do so in circumscribed ways). Burke’s and Rousseau’s work reminds us of the 
importance of social units over and above their component individuals, and of the 
importance of individual liberty in the context of environments (such as the Web) 
which give meaning to liberties while simultaneously limiting behaviour. That is not to 
say that either man resolved the many tensions such issues raise. 
3.4. Hume and Sympathy 
David Hume also extended the Enlightenment toolkit in this area by developing the 
idea of sympathy. We are driven not simply by our personal desires, or by the needs of 
our societies and communities; we have a hard-wired interest – indeed pleasure – in the 
well-being of our fellow-people [15]. Because of this, their narrow interests become 
our wider interests. 
This feeds into the development of trustworthy online systems via a sympathetic 
understanding of C, the set of contexts in which Y is claimed to be trustworthy. This 
set hopefully is a superset of c, the set of contexts in which X has an interest. Often 
there is a mismatch here: the terms and conditions to which X has agreed may rule out 
Y’s function in certain important contexts in c. However, terms and conditions are 
often very long, in legal language, and intended to reduce Z’s liabilities; they are very 
rarely in place to help X. The result is that X does not internalise them, and may 
assume that Y will function to his benefit in contexts where it is not intended to. The 
result is a loss of X’s trust. If Z had a sympathetic understanding of X’s requirements 
and preferences, then Z would try to ensure that Y functioned when X wanted it to – 
not when it was convenient for Z. 
Hume tells us, when we design systems, to establish a set of contexts C which 
cover the multitude of contexts in which a user might be interested. This means that C 
will be more heterogeneous and complex, and less easy to control. However, by 
ensuring that trustworthiness is not narrowly confined to well-understood contexts, X’s 
trust is more likely to be earned and warranted. 
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Adam Smith’s idea of the impartial observer has a similar effect to Humean sympathy. 
Smith extends Hume’s account. Sympathy restrains our selfishness; however, Smith 
also contended that we are able to use the sympathy we have for others to develop 
standards of behaviour to enable society to function more smoothly and in the interests 
of all. These standards are internalised as an “impartial spectator” [29], an idealised 
person who acts as a model. People act as if their actions were being observed and 
judged by the impartial spectator, and the extent of their wisdom and virtue depend on 
how often they follow the imaginary spectator’s ‘suggestions’ in opposition to 
whatever is dictated by their own desires. The man of wisdom “almost identifies 
himself with, he almost becomes himself that impartial spectator, and scarce even feels 
but as that great arbiter of his conduct directs him to feel” ([29], p.147). 
Hence someone hoping to design trustworthy systems needs not only to understand 
the contexts that users are interested in as we noted above, but also needs to create 
holistic system behaviour that will meet the needs of users. In the terms of (1), R needs 
to be tailored to the complexity reflected in a holistic interpretation of C, but also needs 
to specify behaviour that enables the system to address the needs of users holistically 
conceived. 
Hume’s idea of sympathy enabled Smith to derive the closely related but more 
objective notion of the impartial observer; understanding what matters to individuals 
can lead us to conceptualise the behaviours that they will find helpful and useful. 
Similarly, rethinking the contexts in which a trustworthy system operates should enable 
system designers to create systems that function in such contexts. 
3.6. Kant and the Categorical Imperative 
The final Enlightenment thinker that we can learn from about issues of trust and 
trustworthiness is Kant, and in particular his conception of the categorical imperative, 
which states that moral laws must be general ones [16]. For our purposes, the important 
corollary is that people should be treated as ends, not means. Trustworthy systems 
should serve their users, rather than treat them as resources to be exploited. 
So, to take an example, a social networking platform which encourages people to 
place data upon it primarily in order to harvest that data and use it for marketing 
purposes will inevitably lose trust. That is not to say that the data cannot be harvested, 
only that the primary purpose of the platform ought to be the facilitation of interaction, 
and a good user experience. Similarly, a search engine whose primary purpose was 
targeted advertising will lose trust, especially if users begin to suspect that the search 
results were being skewed as well; the primary purpose of the engine should be to 
present the most useful web pages in the most useful order given the query. If, once 
that purpose is accomplished, it proves possible to generate valuable services on the 
back of it, trust is more likely to be warranted and preserved. 
Kant’s discussion is in terms of the duties of a moral actor. However, the basic 
principle of not being self-centred, but being other-directed is the important part. It also 
connects with Smith’s notion of the market and its role in promoting interaction and 
trust ([23], pp.221-224). Regulation treats the individual as a self-centred actor, while 
markets ensure that a more sociable view prevails; if I wish to flourish in a market, I 
must provide products and services that users want. I need to take those users’ 
preferences seriously, and that includes developing trustworthy products along the lines 
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from users. 
And so we move full circle; regulation has an important place in ensuring that the 
Digital Enlightenment provides an important public space for interaction between 
citizens, but the private sector will always have a vital role, both as a force for 
innovation, and a guarantor of trust. 
4. Conclusion: Hints From the Enlightenment 
Of course, it is obvious that this paper is not intended as an in-depth discussion of the 
Enlightenment thinkers, or as an original contribution to historical scholarship. The 
arguments are analogies, helping us develop a roadmap, rather than a fixed plan of 
action. However, I hope it shows how the thinkers of a previous time can still teach us 
lessons about social arrangements in the digital world – in broad terms at least. We 
should not be surprised at this – as many have argued, the political philosophy of the 
Enlightenment sets out the basic lines of political discussion that we still recognise 
today [14], [22]. 
In this paper, I have set out a theory of trust, and shown how we can interpret a 
number of issues surrounding trustworthy systems on line using that theory as 
reference point. The Enlightenment thinkers were enlisted to show how issues of 
trustworthiness were dealt with in earlier times – the connections between people, in 
terms both of basic hard-wired attitudes and of institutional connections, which enable 
people to cooperate and interact without exposing themselves to too much risk. This 
was the key property of the public space that emerged in the 18
th century [7], and is 
also a key desideratum of the World Wide Web [32]. 
If we think about the ground we covered between Hobbes and Kant, two key 
factors emerge. First, we need to ensure that systems designers take a holistic view of 
the relevant agents, contexts and behavioural claims made, as Bus has argued [3]. Trust 
can only connect with trustworthiness if the trustor and trustee speak to each other in 
the same language. X will naturally see a system in a wider context, while Z may be 
tempted to retreat to a narrow technical view. There are severe opportunity costs for Z 
if trustworthy systems are not trusted. 
Second, designers need to be other-directed. Exploitation of trusting users as a 
primary function of a system will eventually undermine trust. This will be an important 
point particularly for a new breed of ‘social machines’ integrating human and machine 
problem-solving [12]. Any such integration must serve the purposes of the humans in 
the loop. As Jaron Lanier has recently written in a powerful polemic, “if you get in 
deep enough, you get trapped. Stop calling yourself a user. You are being used” ([18], 
p.200). 
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